Iran February 2024-

Iran is home to one of the oldest empires in the world, the Achaemenid Empire, led by Cyrus the Great in 550 BC.
Iran Has 26 UNESCO World Heritage Sites
It is also one of the top ten countries to have the most number of World Heritage Sites. Out of 26 sites, two are natural:the Lut Desert in Kerman and Sistan and Baluchestan; and Hyrcanian Forests in Golestan, Mazandaran and Gilan. Other important heritage sites include Persepolis, the ancient capital of the Achaemenid Empire, in Fars and the Historic City of Yazd, the oldest earthen city.
Iran produces 88% of the world’s saffron. …the highest quality of saffron comes from Estahban in the Fars Province and Ghaenat in the Khorasan Province.

Facts You May Not Know About Iran
1. Iran is home to one of the world’s oldest continuously inhabited cities, Susa, which dates back over 6,000 years.
2. Iran boasts one of the world’s oldest monotheistic religions, Zoroastrianism, which dates back over 3,500 years and influenced the development of other major religions.
3. The city of Tabriz in Iran was the capital of the Mongol Ilkhanate in the 13th century and served as a major hub on the Silk Road.
5. The Iranian city of Isfahan was once one of the largest cities in the world and served as the capital of the Persian Empire under the Safavid dynasty.
6. Tehran, Iran’s capital, is the second-largest city in Western Asia, after Istanbul.
7. The ancient city of Yazd in central Iran is known for its unique wind towers, which have been used for centuries to provide natural ventilation in buildings.
8. Iran is home to one of the world’s oldest universities, the University of al-Qarawiyyin in Qom, founded in 859 AD.
9. Iran is one of the few countries in the world where women outnumber men in higher education, with more women enrolled in universities than men.
10. Iran has the highest number of female students studying engineering and science at the undergraduate level compared to any other country in the world.
11. Despite its largely desert climate, Iran is home to over 7,000 plant species, many of which are endemic to the region.
12. Iran has one of the world’s largest populations of Persian leopards, which are endangered and mainly inhabit the Alborz and Zagros Mountains.
13. Iran has a rich tradition of poetry, with poets like Hafez and Rumi being celebrated worldwide for their profound and lyrical verses.
14. Iran is home to one of the world’s oldest bazaars, the Grand Bazaar of Tehran, which dates back over 200 years and spans over 10 kilometers of labyrinthine alleys and bustling market stalls.

16 April
What was Iran thinking? Maybe not what you think.
By Jason Rezaian, served as The Post’s correspondent in Tehran from 2012 to 2016. He spent 544 days unjustly imprisoned by Iranian authorities until his release in January 2016. He is a CNN contributor.
(WaPo) Deciphering what the Iranian regime’s dramatic weekend air assault on Israel means is not as difficult as most observers are making it. There are really only two possible scenarios: Either the Islamic republic’s aim was not to inflict major damage on Israeli targets, or its aim was but it was incapable of doing so.
The clear message seems to be that the regime, its bluster notwithstanding, is weak. Iran’s economy is in tatters, and the government has no credible remedies for people’s woes. Protests against the clerical system have grown in recent years.
Less obvious is the regime’s fear of a conflict that bleeds into Iranian territory. A direct, protracted war with Israel is not something Iran is equipped to fight. For context, Iran, a country of nearly 90 million people, spent roughly $7 billion on its military in 2022. Israel, with a population of about 9 million, spent more than $23 billion. As Iran’s currency spirals downward in value (reaching an all-time low after the weekend attack), it’s difficult to envision how the country could ever catch up to Israel’s military capabilities.
Just as critical, though, is the fact that since its devastating eight-year war with Iraq ended in 1988, the Islamic republic has been able to keep the country mostly safe from external military strikes. It’s one of the few arguments the regime can make to the people about its success. Yet suddenly — and ironically, if it wanted to avoid provocation — that promise of continued internal security feels very flimsy.
… Abductions and assassinations, which are unpredictable and cheap compared with military operations, seem far likelier in the days and weeks ahead than Iran wanting to engage in a kinetic war that would result in heavy domestic casualties.

14 April
Iran is trying to create a new normal with its attack.
Setting a precedent
(Atlantic Council) Strategically, Tehran also sought to establish a novel precedent that will shift the nature of the ongoing conflict with Israel to its further advantage. The precedent is that Iran can attack Israel directly, that it can do so from Iranian soil, and that it can target civilians inside Israel. Iran is thus following a playbook that it has honed for decades: experimenting with a new set of malign actions, assessing the response from adversaries, and, if those responses are deemed either minimal or temporary, establishing those actions as a new normal that then becomes accepted implicitly. This pattern is how Iran became the only country in the world that routinely gives precision weapons to non-state proxies and instructs them to target civilians across borders—and how the rest of world became so inured to this reality that it is now barely even remarked upon.
In recent months, Iran has already successfully established several “new normals” that work to its long-term advantage: Through the Houthis, it has demonstrated a newfound ability to shut the Bab el-Mandeb Strait whenever it wants and to whomever it wants; through Hezbollah, it has demonstrated its ability to threaten Israelis at home and now force massive internal displacements; and through its own actions, it has demonstrated once again its capacity to commit piracy near the Strait of Hormuz and attract little in the way of international condemnation for doing so. If Tehran is similarly successful in establishing the precedent that it can directly target Israelis from Iran, the resulting new normal would become especially valuable after Tehran becomes a declared nuclear-weapons power.
Diplomatically, Iran also hoped to demonstrate both the limits of US power and the reliability of its own. The United States has been committed to Israel’s security for decades and President Joe Biden has personally demonstrated his own dedication to that goal. And yet Iran is nevertheless able to directly threaten Israel without triggering a US military response—or so it hopes. With this weekend’s attack, Iran likely intends that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab governments take away the lesson that they shouldn’t depend on an unreliable and ineffectual US security umbrella, and especially not if that’s the benefit on offer for normalizing relations with Israel. Similarly, Iran hopes to encourage its ally-in-all-but-name Russia and its major economic partner China to blame Israel for the escalation in tensions and to protect it at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This is likely to be a successful strategy; after six months, the UNSC still hasn’t been able to clearly condemn Hamas for its terrorist attacks against Israel, so the odds are that the UNSC will not pass a resolution that plainly condemns Iran for its actions.
Thomas L. Friedman: Iran Just Made a Big Mistake. Israel Shouldn’t Follow.
Iran just unwittingly revealed to the whole world that Iran’s government is so penetrated by Western espionage agencies (because so many Iranians hate their own government) that President Biden was able to predict almost the exact hour of attack over a day in advance, and it showed the whole world that Israel and its Western allies have far superior antimissile capabilities than Iran has missile capabilities.
There now needs to be a massive, sustained, global initiative to isolate Iran — not only to deter it from trying such an adventure again but also to give reason to Israel not to automatically retaliate militarily. That would be a grievous error, too. Iran has a regional network, and Israel needs a regional alliance, along with the U.S., to deter it over the long run.

10 April
Four ways Iran could retaliate against Israel’s latest strike
By Jonathan Panikoff, director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative
(Atlantic Council) Iran is vowing to respond to Israel’s strike last week that killed seven Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials, including Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi. Zahedi was not just another senior Iranian official. Reportedly the commander of the IRGC’s overseas paramilitary organization, known as the Quds Force, in Syria and Lebanon, he was among the most prominent and important Quds Force leaders—and one of Hezbollah’s primary interlocutors.
…some response—unlike with the deaths of previous IRGC officials—is almost certain to occur, or Tehran would be risking its credibility given how loudly it has been saber-rattling about retaliation. …
The big question is: Does Iran want to retaliate in a manner that is equivalent to the loss of Zahedi? Or does Tehran want the appearance of retaliation, sufficient to claim it responded appropriately but with a goal of avoiding an Israeli counter-response that could lead to a regional war?
The answer to that question will determine what happens next. Four broad scenarios are most realistic—with others, such as Iran using this episode as an excuse to race for a nuclear weapon, plausible but unlikely.

8 April
Iran’s Order of Chaos
How the Islamic Republic Is Remaking the Middle East
By Suzanne Maloney
(Foreign Affairs May/June 2024) The Israel-Hamas war—and the possibility that it may explode into a wider conflagration—has upended the determined efforts of three U.S. presidents to pivot American resources and focus away from the Middle East.
…the quagmire in the Middle East presents an opportunity for a breakthrough in a four-decade strategy by Tehran to debilitate one of its foremost regional adversaries, Israel—and to humiliate the United States and drastically diminish its influence in the region.
Iran’s Islamic regime aimed to inspire copycat religious uprisings after its own 1979 revolution, and to many observers, it may appear to have failed. Indeed, the conventional wisdom in Washington and elsewhere has often held that Iran has become contained, even isolated. But this was never true. Instead, Tehran developed a calculated strategy to empower proxy militias and to influence operations in its neighborhood while maintaining plausible deniability—a scheme whose canniness was vindicated by the devastating scope of Hamas’s assault and subsequent attacks by Iranian-affiliated militias in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.
The post–October 7 strategic landscape in the Middle East is one that was largely created by Iran and that plays to its strengths. Tehran sees opportunity in chaos. Iranian leaders are exploiting and escalating the war in Gaza to elevate their regime’s stature, weaken and delegitimize Israel, undermine U.S. interests, and further shape the regional order in their favor. The truth is that the Islamic Republic is now in a better position than ever to dominate the Middle East, including by attaining the ability to disrupt shipping at multiple critical chokepoints.
Left unchecked, the dramatic expansion of Iran’s influence would have a catastrophic impact on Israel, the wider region, and the global economy. To disrupt this amplification of Iranian power, Biden urgently needs to articulate and then implement a clear strategy to protect Palestinian civilians from bearing the brunt of Israel’s military operations, counter Iran’s corrosive war-by-proxy strategy, and blunt the capabilities of Tehran’s accomplices.

1 April
Israeli airstrike on Iran’s consulate in Syria killed two generals, Iranian officials say
(AP) — An Israeli airstrike that demolished Iran’s consulate in Syria on Monday killed Gen. Ali Reza Zahdi, who led the elite Quds Force in Lebanon and Syria until 2016, according to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. It also killed Zahdi’s deputy, Gen Mohammad Hadi Hajriahimi, and five other officers, according to Syrian and Iranian officials. The strike appeared to signify an escalation of Israel’s targeting of military officials from Iran, which provides money and weapons to Hamas and other militants responsible for the Oct. 7 attack against Israel.

4 March
Hard-liners dominate Iran’s parliamentary election after record-low turnout
It remains unclear whether turnout was depressed by voter apathy or an active desire to send a message to Iran’s theocracy.
Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi said the vote saw 25 million ballots cast — a turnout of just under 41 percent. The lowest previous came in the last parliamentary election in 2020, which saw a 42 percent turnout.
“The Friday elections appear to have reaffirmed that Iranian policies will not change in the foreseeable future, but the vote demonstrated the Iranian public is broadly dissatisfied with the course the Islamic Republic is taking,” the New York-based Soufan Center think tank said in an analysis Monday.

27 February
Iranian election turnout could set new record low
Iran may be quiet, but it’s a powder keg that could go off at any time.
Eurasia Group analyst Greg Brew explains the significance of this week’s polls.
(GZERO media) Is the sense of public alienation toward the regime growing?
Dissatisfaction with the regime is currently very high, owing to a variety of factors that include a weak economy, high inflation, widespread corruption, and ongoing and intensifying political repression. The fact that elections are now carefully managed by authorities has produced a broad view that they are sham affairs: as a result, participation in elections has dropped from over 70% to roughly 50%. It is expected to be even lower this year, perhaps the lowest on record. While the regime likely retains the support of some of the population, most Iranians view the Islamic Republic as an illegitimate government.
So, is there a chance of unrest around the vote?
Despite this widespread dissatisfaction, the circumstances don’t seem conducive to the kind of public protest that occurred in 2022, when thousands took to the streets following the death of Mahsa Amini at the hands of the morality police.
How worried is the regime about its legitimacy?
The Islamic Republic has held power for more than forty years. It possesses a large and sophisticated security apparatus and a toolkit of repressive measures that it uses to suppress public dissatisfaction. It is a government has proven, time and again, that it is willing to kill its own people in large numbers in order to remain in power.
That said, the regime has reasons to be worried about its position. Its credibility on a number of important issues, from the economy to terrorism, water scarcity and inflation, is in serious question. It is defined by self-dealing, with more and more of the nation’s wealth flowing to a small elite, particularly senior officers in the IRGC. Millions of Iranians are trying to leave the country, particularly educated members of the middle class.
What are the prospects for political change in the mid-to-long term?
The regime is confident it can hold on to power. It’s fixated on a potential succession crisis, given that Khamenei is eighty-four and in poor health, and the reason for stage-managed elections has been to ensure there’s a smooth transition from the current leader to a Khamenei 2.0. That’s why reformists and moderates have been squeezed out, with even former president Hasan Rouhani denied the opportunity to run for a seat on the Assembly of Experts. There’s virtually no chance the regime permits any reforms or positive political changes, at least not until after succession.
But this policy comes with its own dangers. The Iranian public appears unwilling to resume protests for the moment, but that could change. By refusing to reform, the regime has further undermined its legitimacy, and the transition to a new, similarly conservative Supreme Leader will only harden public dissatisfaction. Iran may be quiet, but it’s a powder keg that could go off at any time.

26 February
‘Become stronger’: Iranians urged to vote as Mideast tensions soar
Qom (Iran) (AFP) – In the Iranian shrine city of Qom, huge street banners remind voters to head to the polls in Friday’s parliamentary elections, held as the Gaza war stokes Middle East tensions.
Regional tensions have soared since the start of the Israel-Hamas war, also drawing in Iran-backed militant groups in Syria and Iraq.
Iran has repeatedly said it does not seek an “expansion” of conflict.

22 February
Iran starts first election campaign since the 2022 mass protests over Mahsa Amini’s death in custody
(AP) — Candidates for Iran’s parliament began campaigning Thursday [February 22] in the country’s first election since the 2022 crackdown on nationwide protests that followed the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in police custody.
Iran’s state television said 15,200 candidates will compete for a four-year term in the 290-seat chamber, which has been controlled by hard-liners for the past two decades. It’s a record number and more than twice the candidates who ran in the 2020 election, when voter turnout was just over 42%, the lowest since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
Amini died in September 2022, after she was arrested by Iran’s morality police for allegedly violating the country’s strict headscarf law that forces women to cover their hair and entire bodies. The protests quickly escalated into calls to overthrow Iran’s clerical rulers. In the severe crackdown that followed, over 500 people were killed and nearly 20,000 were arrested, according to human rights activists in Iran.
It’s election season in Iran
(GZERO) The 2020 election saw Iran’s lowest-ever turnout of 42%, and higher ups in Tehran are worried about an even more embarrassing figure next month. The regime’s legitimacy has suffered so much, according to Eurasia Group Iran expert Greg Brew, that there’s talk of straight-up fudging the numbers, which has not been common practice until now.
But given that election authorities sidelined all but a handful of reformist politicians – not to mention the violent crackdown on protesters in the wake of Mahsa Amini’s death – many voters are likely to stay home to express their discontent.
The real question: Who will succeed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the real center of power, who’s now 84 years old? There’s no clear answer, but Brew says the establishment’s goal in these elections is “to maintain hardliner control over the key aspects of government to create as much consistency as possible, so that when a succession crisis happens it can be handled with a minimum of disruption.”

21 February
Ian Bremmer: Why Iran is pulling back from the brink
As Israel threatens an offensive into Rafah, its regional nemesis Iran is pulling itself away from the brink of war – and may even welcome a cease-fire in Gaza.
Since an attack by one of its Iraqi proxies killed three American servicemen in Jordan on Jan. 28, Iran has been signaling its allies in the Resistance Front to cool it and avoid actions that might prompt retaliation from Israel or the United States.
The commander of Iran’s Quds Force, the elite branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, traveled to Iraq in January and ordered Iran’s allies there to hold off on attacking US forces. The pressure from their patron in Tehran seems to have worked, at least for now: Since Feb. 4, no US troops have been targeted in militia attacks. Iran has also told its closest ally, Hezbollah, to avoid provoking Israel at a time when tensions on Israel’s border with Lebanon remain high.
While the Houthis, Iran’s ally in Yemen, have continued their attacks on commercial shipping, Iran took a notable step to protect its own assets in the Red Sea. The Iranian observation ship, the MV Behshad, widely believed to be assisting Houthi targeting, has dropped anchor near a Chinese squadron in Djibouti and isn’t actively involved in Houthi operations anymore. There’s even been tentative signs that Iran’s enrichment of uranium has slowed a little – though Iran continues to enrich at a rapid pace, it doesn’t seem as interested in building a bomb as it once was.
Iran continues to talk tough, but actions speak louder than words. And for the moment at least, those actions seem geared toward keeping the Middle East conflict from spreading any further than it already has.
Though it’s hard to know for sure what’s going on inside the head of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, my bet is Iran’s moves are down to self-preservation and risk management. As is often the case, the leadership of the Islamic Republic is worried first and foremost about its own survival. While it’s made some gains from the crisis so far, Iran is now trying to avoid a bigger fight that could endanger its regional position and put more pressure on its own shaky domestic security.

26 January
China presses Iran to rein in Houthi attacks in Red Sea, sources say
Iran-backed Houthis attacking commercial ships in Red Sea
Trading powerhouse China has called for attacks to stop
Oil trade gives China leverage over Iran, analysts say
Iran cares about China but weighs other priorities – sources
(Reuters) – Chinese officials have asked their Iranian counterparts to help rein in attacks on ships in the Red Sea by the Iran-backed Houthis, or risk harming business relations with Beijing, four Iranian sources and a diplomat familiar with the matter said.
The discussions about the attacks and trade between China and Iran took place at several recent meetings in Beijing and Tehran, the Iranian sources said, declining to provide details about when they took place or who attended.

30 January

Iran has so far resisted direct involvement in the Gaza war, but is that changing?
James Devine, Associate Professor Politics and International Relations, Mount Allison University
(The Conversation) Iran has tried to keep the war in Gaza at arm’s length by providing support for Hamas through armed groups it backs in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq.
The Islamic Republic has indicated it wants neither to get directly involved in the fighting nor see the conflict escalate across the region. But as illustrated by the recent drone attack by pro-Iranian militias in Jordan that killed three American soldiers, the violence is spreading. Tehran may not be able to sustain its strategy much longer.
Tehran’s support for Hamas dates back to the 1990s, though the two have never been a perfect ideological match. Hamas comes from the Sunni sect of Islam, identifying more closely with the Muslim Brotherhood than it does with Shi’a Iran.
Iran does not appear to have been involved in the planning or execution of Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023 attack on Israel. Indeed, United States intelligence reported Tehran was surprised by events.
Nevertheless, as the Gaza war continues, Iran is playing an important role. Tehran provides Hamas with rhetorical support and indirect military backing through the other members of the Axis of Resistance. While not tilting the balance of power in Gaza, this has signalled to the West and Israel that the campaign against Hamas will have a cost, particularly if it escalates.
Nevertheless, Tehran’s message that it does not intend to get directly involved in the fighting has been relayed directly to Hamas by the Islamic Republic’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and to the U.S. privately through intermediaries.
Tehran’s stance is evident in the particular way military force has been employed. Hezbollah’s attacks have been limited in size and restricted to the area around the Lebanese border — significant enough to indicate support for Hamas, but not threatening enough to justify Israel opening a second front. 30 January 2024