Globalization & Governance 2018

Written by  //  January 20, 2018  //  Globalization, Government & Governance  //  No comments


The Global Risks Report 2018, 13th Edition Executive Summary
(World Economic Forum WEF) Last year’s Global Risks Report was published at a time of heightened global uncertainty and strengthening popular discontent with the existing political and economic order. The report called for “fundamental reforms to market capitalism” and a rebuilding of solidarity within and between countries. One year on, a global economic recovery is under way, offering new opportunities for progress that should not be squandered: the urgency of facing up to systemic challenges has, if anything, intensified amid proliferating indications of uncertainty, instability and fragility.
Humanity has become remarkably adept at understanding how to mitigate conventional risks that can be relatively easily isolated and managed with standard riskmanagement approaches. But we are much less competent when it comes to dealing with complex risks in the interconnected systems that underpin our world, such as organizations, economies, societies and the environment. There are signs of strain in many of these systems: our accelerating pace of change is testing the absorptive capacities of institutions, communities and individuals. When risk cascades through a complex system, the danger is not of incremental damage but of “runaway collapse” or an abrupt transition to a new, suboptimal status quo.
Full Report (17 January)

20 January
(Quartz) … the Davos echo chamber will feature one of its most ideologically diverse slates of leaders ever. Take the first and last major mainstage presentations. First is Indian prime minister Narendra Modi, who heads a less-and-less secular democracy developing “profoundly illiberal traits.”
The last will be Donald Trump, who has completely ruptured the Davos ideal of what global leadership means. His “Make America Great Again” ideology and fealty-at-all-costs management style has helped create a nation so deeply divided that basic functions of governance have broken down. In the president’s “America First” view, economic gains by definition come at the expense other countries; this won’t go over well with the multilateral-minded Davos crowd.
Sandwiched between the populists is German chancellor Angela Merkel, the longest-serving head of a G7 government and “leader of the free world.” Also appearing mid-week are Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau and French president Emmanuel Macron—young, centrist, pro-globalization, self-declared feminists tailor-made for the traditional Davos set. They are all likely to call for more global co-operation on trade, governance, and climate change; for most in the crowd, it will be a welcome return to traditional Davos talking points.
Even as Modi and Trump poke holes in the liberal bubble, it remains the case that the forum is an ultra-exclusive, unrepresentative gathering. Davos attendees are overwhelmingly rich, white, and male—women comprise just 21% of delegates, although organizers have filled the program with sessions on gender equality and tapped an all-female set of co-chairs. The bubble may be a bit more boisterous than before, but don’t bet on it bursting anytime soon.—Heather Timmons and Eshe Nelson

19 January
Trump to tout U.S. economy, urge fair trade at elite Davos forum
(Reuters) – U.S. President Donald Trump will be entering something of a lion’s den when he visits the elitist enclave of Davos next week, rubbing shoulders with the same “globalists” that he campaigned against in winning the 2016 election.
“Globalization has made the financial elite who donate to politicians very wealthy. But it has left millions of our workers with nothing but poverty and heartache,” he said on June 28, 2016, in Pennsylvania.
Trump retains the same anti-globalist beliefs but has struggled to rewrite trade deals that he sees as benefiting other countries.
Trump will be speaking two days after German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron take the stage in Davos.
Both ardent defenders of multilateralism and liberal democratic values, they are expected to lay out the counter-argument to Trump’s “America First” policies.

16 January
Democracy in Crisis
Democracy faced its most serious crisis in decades in 2017 as its basic tenets—including guarantees of free and fair elections, the rights of minorities, freedom of the press, and the rule of law—came under attack around the world.
Seventy-one countries suffered net declines in political rights and civil liberties, with only 35 registering gains. This marked the 12th consecutive year of decline in global freedom.
The United States retreated from its traditional role as both a champion and an exemplar of democracy amid an accelerating decline in American political rights and civil liberties.
By Michael J. Abramowitz, President
(Freedom House) Political rights and civil liberties around the world deteriorated to their lowest point in more than a decade in 2017, extending a period characterized by emboldened autocrats, beleaguered democracies, and the United States’ withdrawal from its leadership role in the global struggle for human freedom.
Today, it is democracy that finds itself battered and weakened. For the 12th consecutive year, according to Freedom in the World, countries that suffered democratic setbacks outnumbered those that registered gains. States that a decade ago seemed like promising success stories—Turkey and Hungary, for example—are sliding into authoritarian rule. The military in Myanmar, which began a limited democratic opening in 2010, executed a shocking campaign of ethnic cleansing in 2017 and rebuffed international criticism of its actions. Meanwhile, the world’s most powerful democracies are mired in seemingly intractable problems at home, including social and economic disparities, partisan fragmentation, terrorist attacks, and an influx of refugees that has strained alliances and increased fears of the “other.”


World Order 2.0
Richard N. Haass
Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 ended the Thirty Years’ War in Europe, the concept of sovereignty – the right of countries to an independent existence and autonomy – has formed the core of the international order. But, in a globalized world, an order based solely [on] sovereign rights has become increasingly inadequate.
(Project Syndicate) … in a globalized world, a global operating system premised solely on respect for sovereignty – call it World Order 1.0 – has become increasingly inadequate. Little stays local anymore. Just about anyone and anything, from tourists, terrorists, and refugees to e-mails, diseases, dollars, and greenhouse gases, can reach almost anywhere. The result is that what goes on inside a country can no longer be the concern of that country alone. Today’s realities call for an updated operating system—World Order 2.0 – based on “sovereign obligation,” the notion that sovereign states have not just rights but also obligations to others.
A new international order will also require an expanded set of norms and arrangements, beginning with an agreed-upon basis for statehood. Existing governments would agree to consider bids for statehood only in cases where there was a historical justification, a compelling rationale, and popular support, and where the proposed new entity is viable.
World Order 2.0 must also include prohibitions on carrying out or in any way supporting terrorism. More controversially, it must include strengthened norms proscribing the spread or use of weapons of mass destruction. As it stands, while the world tends to agree on constraining proliferation by limiting countries’ access to the relevant technology and material, the consensus often breaks down once proliferation has occurred. This should become a topic of discussion at bilateral and multilateral meetings, not because it would lead to a formal agreement, but because it would focus attention on applying stringent sanctions or undertaking military action, which could then reduce the odds of proliferation.
Another essential element of a new international order is cooperation on climate change, which may be the quintessential manifestation of globalization, because all countries are exposed to its effects, regardless of their contribution to it. The 2015 Paris climate agreement – in which governments agreed to limit their emissions and to provide resources to help poorer countries adapt – was a step in the right direction. Progress on this front must continue. [emphasis added]
Cyberspace is the newest domain of international activity characterized by both cooperation and conflict. The goal in this area should be to create international arrangements that encourage benign uses of cyberspace and discourage malign uses. Governments would have to act consistently within this regime as part of their sovereign obligations – or face sanctions or retaliation.
Global health presents a different set of challenges. Fortunately, the notion of sovereign obligation is already advanced in this sphere: countries are responsible for trying to detect infectious disease outbreaks, responding appropriately, and notifying others around the world.
refugees, there is no substitute for effective local action aimed at preventing situations that generate large refugee flows in the first place. In principle, this is an argument for humanitarian intervention in selective situations. But translating this principle into practice will remain difficult, given divergent political agendas and the high costs of effective intervention. Even without a consensus, however, there is a strong case for increasing funding for refugees, ensuring their humane treatment, and setting fair quotas for their resettlement.
Trade agreements are, by definition, pacts of reciprocal sovereign obligations regarding tariff and non-tariff barriers. When a party believes that obligations are not being met, it has recourse to arbitration through the World Trade Organization. But things are less clear when it comes to government subsidies or currency manipulation. The challenge, therefore, is to define appropriate sovereign obligations in these areas in future trade pacts, and to create mechanisms to hold governments accountable.
Establishing the concept of sovereign obligations as a pillar of the international order will take decades of consultations and negotiations – and even then, its acceptance and impact will be uneven. Progress will come only voluntarily, from countries themselves, rather than from any top-down edict. Realistically, it will be difficult to forge agreement on what specific sovereign obligations states have and how they should be enforced. (Jan 24, 2017)

14 November
Democracy Beyond the Nation-State
According to the Harvard economist Dani Rodrik, it is impossible to have full national sovereignty, democracy, and globalization simultaneously. The concept of a “political trilemma of the world economy” is useful, but it becomes less binding when one takes into account levels of government above and especially below the nation-state.
By Kemal Derviş, former Minister of Economic Affairs of Turkey and former Administrator for UNDP
(Project Syndicate) According to the Harvard economist Dani Rodrik, it is impossible to have full national sovereignty, democracy, and globalization simultaneously. The concept of a “political trilemma of the world economy,” which Javier Solana also , is useful, but incomplete.
… Rodrik does not portray this trilemma as a hard-and-fast rule. Rather, his goal is to highlight the challenges associated with fostering or maintaining these three institutional arrangements, partly or fully. But, to get the most out of Rodrik’s concept, it is necessary to account for another dimension: the many levels of governance that exist in today’s world.
The nation-state, managed by national government, remains the fundamental building block of the international order. But below the nation-state are states (or provinces), cities, and regions, which may have their own governance structures. Above, there are supranational blocs like the European Union and global institutions like the United Nations. Any discussion of the trilemma must take into account these various levels of governance. …the tension between democracy and globalization seems to be less acute at, say, the municipal level. It helps that subnational governments tend to be focused on more local-level concerns – such as infrastructure, education, and housing – that are not perceived as being strongly influenced by globalization.
what if we adopted a new approach, in which local-level democracy and sovereignty were strengthened instead? In many countries, if not most, cities are the centers of innovation and progress, as the promise of agglomeration, economies of scale, and positive spillovers attract high-performing firms. Citizens feel close to their municipal governments and proud of their cities, but their pride in their identity does not have the damaging qualities of nationalism. As the nation-state cedes some of its power to regional, state, or municipal governments, the trilemma weakens. Both democracy, with its concomitant sense of belonging, and globalization, driven by cosmopolitan cities open to the world, can thrive, without causing any country to lose sovereignty.

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