U.S.-China relations May 2025-April 2026

14 April
Trump’s Blockade Risks Upending an Emerging Détente With China
In a thinly veiled critique of the war in Iran, China’s leader said the world could not risk reverting “to the law of the jungle.”
(NYT) When China declared on Monday that the U.S. blockade of Iranian oil leaving the Strait of Hormuz was “dangerous and irresponsible,” it was a brief window into President Trump’s latest challenge: how to keep the Iran conflict from upending an emerging détente with China.
Mr. Trump is expected to land in Beijing in four weeks, in what was imagined as a carefully planned, highly orchestrated effort to recast the relationship between the world’s two largest economies.
The president has already delayed the trip once, and White House officials insist there is no discussion of putting it off again, even if the United States is still choking off Iranian oil exports. Ninety percent of those exports — more than 1.3 million barrels per day — were purchased by China before the American and Israeli attack began on Feb. 28.
At first the Chinese were relatively quiet about the military action, knowing that the shipments already at sea and an impressive stockpile of emergency reserves of oil would likely tide them through. They ignored Mr. Trump’s demand that China send warships to keep the strait open. They produced standard-issue calls for both sides to stand down.
But once the blockade began on Monday, and facing the prospect that Chinese-flagged cargo ships, some manned by Chinese crews, could be turned away by the U.S. Navy, the tone shifted.
China’s leader, Xi Jinping, made his first public comments on the war on Tuesday, saying that the world could not risk reverting “to the law of the jungle.” He never mentioned the United States or Mr. Trump. But he did not need to, adding during a meeting with the crown prince of Abu Dhabi that “to maintain the authority of international rule of law, we cannot use it when it suits us and abandon it when it doesn’t.”

6 April
How the Iran war is torpedoing the Donroe Doctrine
By ERIC BAZAIL-EIMIL
(Politico Forecast) Donald Trump is managing a delicate truce between the U.S. and China, despite stocking his administration with vocal China hawks. Ahead of a mid-May trip to China — his first visit there in nearly a decade — where he’ll meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping, he has one order for White House officials: Don’t rock the boat.
Usually, a national security or foreign policy hand would head up the White House’s China strategy, but that task has fallen to Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, suggesting that Trump’s priorities in Beijing are more economic than anything.
Why is the Treasury Secretary heading up the administration’s China strategy? What does that tell us about Donald Trump’s priorities in China right now?
… Trump sees the China relationship as primarily an economic one, and Bessent, a former hedge fund manager with market credibility, is widely seen as the most capable person in the Cabinet to navigate it. If this were primarily a national security confrontation, you’d see more of [Secretary of State Marco] Rubio or [Defense Secretary Pete] Hegseth. It isn’t, at least for now — and Bessent, widely seen as a steady hand in turbulent waters, has the president’s trust to keep it that way.
Who has Trump’s ear on his China strategy? Is he listening to Bessent, or is Bessent simply the enforcer?
Both. Bessent has genuine influence over the strategy. People close to the Treasury secretary described him to me as a pragmatic hawk — one who believes that unwinding decades of economic dependence requires patience rather than speed. But he’s also very much an enforcer of the truce the two countries reached in Busan, South Korea, last fall.

25 March
Trump to visit China in mid-May
The trip, initially planned for the end of March, was postponed because of the war in Iran.
President Donald Trump has rescheduled his summit with Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, for May 14 to 15, the White House announced Wednesday.

Trump, Xi, and the Specter of 1914
How America and China Can Avoid the Blunders That Led to World War I
Odd Arne Westad
(Foreign Affairs) … Whenever U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping meet for their long-promised summit in Beijing, the dangers of unbridled rivalry should be clear to both men. Out-of-control conflict between the world’s two leading powers could be disastrous for their countries and for the world at large. Both sides say they want to find ways of stemming the slide towards confrontation, yet neither leader seems to understand that temporary truces on trade and tariffs, or stated intentions on narcotics control, are not sufficient to turn U.S.-Chinese relations around.
For China and the United States…to enter some kind of détente, positive cooperation will be necessary, including dealing with some of the underlying problems in the relationship.
… Although the United States is not the only country facing increasing inequality, the social and political consequences are worse there because of the better position that many American workers are used to. It is not surprising that many citizens believe that domestic elites are conspiring with foreign powers to line their own pockets and prop up an international economic system that is unfair to American workers.
THE OTHER SIDE OF THE CHINESE MIRACLE
Much of this economic resentment is directed toward China, both because of its phenomenal growth and because of the methods it has used to achieve that growth. It is also easier to direct criticism at a foreign country that has a very different political system. But while much of the blame is exaggerated, China’s control of global supply chains is a real threat to the United States. …
…the leadership styles of Trump and Xi seem incompatible. Trump is impulsive and increasingly unsteady in terms of his overall aims. Xi, while a much better strategist and the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping, doesn’t diverge far from the script and seems incapable of the private, spontaneous appeals to arrangements that could be part of a reordering of U.S.-Chinese relations. If 1914 teaches anything, it is that great powers need at least a few clear reasons to step back from the brink. Finding those reasons will require more than either man has so far been willing to give.

23 March
Trump-Xi summits: an inside view with US ex-diplomat William Klein
Former diplomat posted to Beijing speaks on Iran, Taiwan and global supply chains as details of Xi-Trump meeting are worked out
(SCMP) William Klein worked for more than two decades as a US diplomat, including in several senior roles at the United States’ embassy in Beijing from 2016 to 2021. He worked at the American Institute in Taiwan and on the US State Department’s China desk in Washington, and occupied US diplomatic posts in South Asia, the Middle East and the former Soviet Union. He is based in the Berlin office of FGS Global, a strategic advisory and communications firm.
What should we expect from US President Donald Trump’s visit to China – whenever it takes place? Will it have any impact on the trajectory of China-US relations during Trump’s second term?
Since the Busan summit [in South Korea on October 30], we have had a truce in the US-China relationship. I wouldn’t call it an armistice. I certainly wouldn’t call it a peace treaty. Both sides clearly have a common interest in not allowing the relationship to deteriorate any further. So the most important outcome of President Trump’s visit to China, whenever it may take place, will be the two sides reinforcing their interest in containing the competition in the relationship, preventing things from going off the rails, or from getting worse.
We will certainly see a reaffirmation of the commitments made in Busan with respect to export controls, tariffs, things of this nature. I expect other commercial announcements, like further purchase agreements on the part of China, such as for agricultural goods or commercial aircraft.
The big question will be: will the two sides announce further measures to loosen some of the export controls or reduce some of the tariffs? It is very difficult to predict.
My conversation with both American and Chinese government stakeholders suggests that expectations for the visit are modest. Still, this visit is important for the further trajectory of the US-China relationship.

21 March
What are the real reasons behind the change of date for Trump’s China visit?
After confirmation that the high-stakes Xi-Trump summit will be delayed, analysts find a complex story beneath the official surface.
(SCMP) The official line is straightforward: US President Donald Trump asked for a delay to his long-anticipated summit in Beijing with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, and it has been pushed back by “a month or so”.
According to the White House, moving the meeting allows Trump to remain in the US and manage the escalating war with Iran, including urgent efforts to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
But beneath the surface, a more complex story emerges: months of growing frustrations, mismatched expectations, unanswered proposals and a distracted Trump administration, all compounded by geopolitical crosswinds.
The result is a latticework of concerns that were straining the lead-up to the summit long before missiles escalated Middle East tensions, leaving Beijing increasingly wary of the meeting and bracing for even lower expectations.
Trump did not give details on Tuesday of the diplomatic exchange behind the rescheduling or exactly when the summit might come together, other than “in five or six weeks”.

12 February
China confirms it is talking to US about Trump visit as trade truce stays on the cards
US president and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping may roll back tariffs for up to a year as officials seek short-term economic wins
China has confirmed that discussions were under way about US President Donald Trump’s planned visit in April, when sources said the two sides were expected to extend their current trade truce by up to one year.
Lin Jian, a foreign ministry spokesman, said President Xi Jinping had repeated an invitation to Trump to visit when the pair spoke by phone last week.
“The two sides are in communication on this,” Lin added, stressing the importance of talks between the two heads of state.
The two reached an uneasy truce when they met in South Korea in October, agreeing to roll back tariffs and export controls after months of spiralling tensions marked by triple-digit “retaliatory” levies and Beijing’s sweeping boycott of US agricultural goods for much of 2025.
Since then, China has resumed purchases of American soybeans, a politically sensitive crop in the US.

America and China at the Edge of Ruin
A Last Chance to Step Back From the Brink
David M. Lampton and Wang Jisi
(Foreign AffairsMarch/April) Since the early 2010s, the relationship between Beijing and Washington has steadily shifted from cautious engagement to tense rivalry. Step by step, both sides have adopted national security strategies that treat the other not merely as a competitor but as the principal threat to their core values, political legitimacy, and vital national interests. This evolution has been driven not only by external events but also by domestic political incentives, bureaucratic maneuvering, and deeply rooted anxieties about vulnerability, decline, and status. Each country’s increasingly muscular attempts to deter the other have caused rising friction in the realms of defense, economics, culture, and diplomacy. What began as hedging behavior has hardened into mutually reinforcing strategic postures that assume long-term hostility as the organizing principle of policy.
A world in which the two most powerful countries organize their strategies around mutual enmity is one marked by arms races, institutional paralysis, and the neglect of shared threats such as climate change, pandemic infection, and financial instability. In such a world, conflicts can readily spiral out of control. In the absence of meaningful guardrails, the present trajectory risks locking both societies and the international system into a condition of managed hostility, diminished prosperity, and chronic insecurity—a condition in which competition becomes an end in itself and the costs are borne not by Beijing and Washington alone but by the whole world.

3-5 February
Explainer: How Two Panama Canal Ports Became a US-China Flashpoint
(Bloomberg) When President Donald Trump called for the US to retake control of the Panama Canal during his inauguration speech last year, falsely claiming that the waterway is being operated by China, it set off a chain of events that landed Hong Kong tycoon Li Ka-shing in the middle of a proxy battle between two superpowers.
A subsidiary of Li’s conglomerate CK Hutchison Holdings Ltd. has operated ports at both ends of the Panama Canal for almost three decades. The two terminals are part of an expansive deal that CK Hutchison unveiled last March to sell 43 of its global ports to a consortium of buyers including BlackRock Inc.
The agreement was welcomed by Trump, who hailed it as the US reclaiming influence over the Panama Canal, but drew the ire of the Chinese government, which denounced the deal as bowing to American pressure.
Talks to finalize the sale have stalled amid regulatory hurdles and uncertainty over the role of state-owned China Cosco Shipping Corp., who CK Hutchison invited into the group of buyers to appease Beijing’s concerns. There’s now an additional complication after Panama’s Supreme Court ruled in late January that the contract granted to CK Hutchison to run the Balboa and Cristobal ports is unconstitutional.

China Warns Panama of ‘Heavy Price’ on Court Ruling on Ports
Takeaways by Bloomberg AI
The Chinese government has denounced a ruling by Panama’s top court to void CK Hutchison Holdings Ltd.’s contract to operate two ports as “extremely absurd”.
The Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office warned Panama would pay a “heavy price” if it fails to change course, accusing the country of succumbing to hegemony and yielding to intimidation.
The ruling has emerged as a geopolitical flashpoint between the US and China, with China’s Foreign Ministry and the Hong Kong government criticizing the decision, while US Secretary of State Marco Rubio praised it as an encouraging development.
The two ports near the strategic Panama Canal have emerged as a geopolitical flashpoint between the US and China. The commentary is the starkest rebuke yet by Beijing over the ruling last month, which marks a win for US President Donald Trump’s effort to ensure US dominance in Latin America and rein in China’s control of strategic infrastructure there.
The court’s decision risks fueling tensions between Washington and Beijing as the two sides seek to maintain a trade truce ahead of Trump’s scheduled visit to China in April.
Trump has criticized what he perceives as Chinese influence over the canal and threatened to place it under American control, while Panama President Jose Raul Mulino has repeatedly asserted his nation’s full sovereignty over its operation. Hong Kong billionaire Li Ka-shing’s CK Hutchison began operating the facilities in 1997, with the contract later extended in 2021.
Rising tensions between Washington and Beijing over the Panama Canal could further complicate the ports sale by CK Hutchison. The transaction — announced in March last year — has become one of the tycoon’s most geopolitically fraught deals, despite the potential to generate more than $19 billion in cash if completed.
The company said it has initiated arbitration proceedings against Panama. In a stock exchange filing Wednesday, CK Hutchison warned shareholders and potential investors to “exercise caution” when dealing in its shares or other securities.

30 January
Panama supreme court cancels Hong Kong company’s canal contracts
Panama’s president says strategic waterway will operate as normal after ruling that advances US policy aims
Panama’s president said ports at each end of the Panama canal would operate as usual after the country’s supreme court ruled the concession held by a subsidiary of a Chinese company was unconstitutional.
The court’s decision on Thursday, which helps US attempts to block any Chinese influence over the strategic waterway, immediately drew a sharp rebuke from Beijing.
José Raúl Mulino, Panama’s president, said on Friday that until the court’s ruling was executed maritime officials would work with Panama Ports Company (PPC), a subsidiary of Hong Kong’s CK Hutchison, to ensure continuing operations.
Once the concession was formally ended, a subsidiary of the Danish logistics company AP Moller-Maersk would operate the ports in a transitional phase until a new concession could be awarded, Mulino said.
The Trump administration made blocking China’s influence over the canal one of its priorities in the hemisphere. Panama was Marco Rubio’s first overseas stop as US secretary of state.
Despite the insistence by Panama’s government and the canal authority that China had no influence, Rubio made clear that Washington viewed the operation of the ports as a national security issue. Donald Trump, the US president, has said Panama should return the canal to US control.
26 January 2025
Tension and defiance in Panama after Trump threatens to ‘take back’ canal
Diplomatic frenzy and rattled nerves in republic as officials and former president reject US president’s comments
four days into Donald Trump’s second administration, here we are. Trump has declared that he is “taking back” the Panama canal, sending TV crews from Washington to Beijing scrambling here to cover a crisis that has led to frenzied diplomatic efforts and elicited fears of a repeat of the 1989 US military invasion.
Never mind that there are no signs of the Chinese influence Trump claims dominates this waterway, and the canal’s administrators deny his accusations that they overcharge US ships. Panama may have the truth on its side – the question is whether that counts for much these days.

26 January
Three potential pathways for US-China relations under Trump
Ryan Hass
(Brookings Executive Summary) Without attracting significant fanfare, President Donald Trump has reoriented America’s approach to China. He has shifted the emphasis of the relationship away from an ideological battle or great power struggle toward competition focused on trade and technology. He has bestowed respect upon Chinese President Xi Jinping and, together, they have ushered in a period of relative strategic calm in the bilateral relationship. This was demonstrated by the one-year truce they adopted for their trade war during their October 30, 2025, meeting in Busan, South Korea. Trump’s supporters tout his progress in doing deals with China, while his detractors argue that Trump is giving more than he is gaining in return.
This discontinuity in Trump’s approach to the U.S.-China relationship begs the question of what effect it will have on the relationship’s trajectory in the coming years. This piece examines three possible pathways: first, a soft landing whereby both leaders invest in permanently improving the relationship; second, a hard split whereby Trump grows disillusioned and angry toward China over time, similar to the arc of events during the first Trump administration; and third, a situation whereby both leaders buy time to build insulation against each other, though without any pretense of expecting a permanent improvement in bilateral relations.

14 January
Get ready for Trump’s team of China hawks, warns The New Yorker’s Susan Glasser (video)
GZERO Staff
China is in for an unprecedentedly tough time. Donald Trump’s cabinet of China hawks signals a potentially more confrontational stance with Beijing, a foreign policy approach that will function not unlike the first Trump administration’s over Russia, says The New Yorker’s Susan Glasser during a GZERO livestream to discuss the 2025 Top Risks report. Glasser argues that it will be a kind of push-pull relationship between more establishment, old-fashioned conservative types and “Trump’s own impulses and instincts.” She adds that “he’s going to want to keep American business tycoons happy. He’s got Elon Musk whispering in his ear at all times.” So, to what extent will the China hawks be able to impose their agenda in a Trump 2.0 administration?

Trump’s ‘assault on Venezuela’ is ‘opening move’ to take down major rival: analysis
Ewan Gleadow
(Raw Story) An attack on Venezuela orchestrated by Donald Trump’s administration is the “opening move” to a much larger rival, a political commentator has claimed.
Writing in The Guardian, Owen Jones suggested the strike on Venezuela earlier this week, and subsequent capture of President Nicolás Maduro, is part of a longer game plan which would see Trump stand off against China. The major trade rival has become a growing concern for the Trump administration, with Jones citing a growing trade industry between China and Latin America as a reason the president may be keen to take action in the Western Hemisphere.
Jones wrote, “And, crucially, China – the main US rival – has grown in power across the continent. The two-way goods trade between China and Latin America was 259 times larger in 2023 than it was in 1990.”

2025

25 November
How Xi Played Trump
Beijing Gambled and Is Now Reaping the Rewards
Jonathan A. Czin
(Foreign Affairs) … Whereas most countries targeted by Trump’s tariffs have rushed to the negotiating table, China has instead dug in.
China has gained, not suffered, from this obduracy. Xi has secured Trump’s commitment to several meetings in 2026, as well as concessions from the administration on incredibly contentious issues: Taiwan and U.S. export controls. By every measure, China is diplomatically, strategically, and technologically better off than it was a year ago. In contrast, the Trump administration’s strategy, which has lurched from attempts to clobber China economically through tariffs to attempts to mollify China through serial concessions, has achieved little. Beijing has been neither cowed nor assuaged. The United States seems less able to either reassure or deter China; Chinese officials have learned that the Trump administration, for all its bluster, will not follow through on its promises or its threats.

19 November
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission annual report
Topics this year include China’s revisionist ambitions with Russia, Iran, and North Korea; China and Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands; how Beijing built its manufacturing and innovation engine; China’s ambitions to dominate space; China Shock 2.0; Beijing’s weaponization of supply chains; China’s electrification drive; and a review of Taiwan, Hong Kong, economics, trade, security, politics, and foreign affairs development in 2025.
SMALL ISLANDS, BIG STAKES:
CHINA’S PLAYBOOK IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS
Cleo Paskal: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission annual report features a dedicated section on China in the Pacific Islands. The whole report is well worth reading (as usual), and for those looking at the Pacific, the islands section is essential. Excerpt:
Key Findings
• Beijing views the Pacific Islands region as essential to its goals of blunting U.S. military power in the Indo-Pacific, projecting its own power beyond the second island chain, and isolating Taiwan diplomatically and militarily. China has invested significant resources into a multifaceted strategy to expand its influence and undermine U.S. relationships across the region to achieve these objectives.
• Over the past two decades, China has systematically expanded high-level diplomacy, propaganda, people-to-people exchanges, media penetration, and malign influence activities in the Pacific Islands in an attempt to shape the region’s information environment in ways favorable to Beijing and harmful to the United States and its allies and partners.
• China has spent decades building economic influence in the Pacific Islands. China is now a major trade partner for almost every Pacific Island country, far outpacing the United States and even overtaking traditional partners like Australia. The dependence of Pacific Island economies on exports to China and Chinese tourism have exposed the region to China’s economic leverage and coercion. China has also exploited its investments in the region to engage in elite capture, entrench preferred providers in critical infrastructure, and develop control over critical resources.
• Over the past several years, China has leveraged its political and economic influence to expand security and police cooperation with Pacific Island countries, enabling Beijing to promote authoritarian security norms and potentially lay the groundwork for access to dual-use facilities.
• ..The relative weakening of U.S. influence in the Pacific Islands could have severe implications for U.S. power projection in the Indo-Pacific, potentially hindering the United States’ ability to deter Chinese military aggression in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and globally.

16 November
Inside Trump’s scramble to reduce US dependence on Chinese rare-earth metals
The White House has made it a top priority to return the rare-earth industry to US shores. But is it really feasible?
… Breaking China’s processing and manufacturing dominance in these materials, essential for some semiconductors, batteries and armaments, is a top priority for the Trump administration that has made a bet, via tariffs and other economic tools, that it can return the industry to US shores.
The US and China have now brokered a trade truce on rare earths but China, with approximately 70% of global mining and over 90% of global processing capacity, has a head start that Trump will struggle to erode.
There’s no easy fix for the US to reset its dependence on Chinese production of minerals critical to national security, semiconductor production, and the transfer of energy production from fossil fuels to wind and solar. The US imported 80% of the rare earths it used in 2024, according to the US Geological Survey.
For some rare-earth minerals such as dysprosium, used in chip production, and samarium, essential to military applications, Chinese refinement dominance rises to 99%. Dysprosium and terbium are used in magnets essential for electric engines in electric vehicles and generators in wind turbines, along with uses in cellphones, high-intensity lighting and nuclear reactors.

12-13 (Update) November
How China’s rare earth leverage works – limits, risks and global responses
Discover:
• How effectively can China really implement its control of critical materials?
• To what extent can China use this tool, given realistic limitations?
• How exactly does China control key segments of the rare earth production chain?
• What about lithium-ion batteries?
(SCMP) The weaponisation of critical materials was not a bridge that Beijing crossed in the early years of its trade war with Washington, which began in 2018.
But China has grown more confident, and leadership has shifted from hesitation to measured assertiveness on critical-material controls, as demonstrated in its actions this year amid trade tensions with Washington, according to Morgan Stanley researchers.
With such leverage in mind, this explainer uses their report – “Navigating China’s Export Control Playbook and Market Impact”, published on Sunday – to examine the effectiveness of that tool in Beijing’s arsenal, its limitations, and China’s real strengths in the rare earth supply chain.
Even amid a temporary truce after the October meeting between presidents Xi Jinping and Donald Trump, selective responses remain likely, mirroring the US’ “small yard, high fence” logic.
For example, the report said that if a US ally were to block exports of chips and lithography tools to China, Beijing might target critical inputs, such as rare earths, to that country.
Such reciprocal escalation aims to deter full alignment with US policies and secure breathing room for China’s push towards tech self-sufficiency, a top priority in its next five-year plan, the report noted.
Over the past five years, Chinese policymakers have strengthened the legal framework of export controls by transforming the once fragmented regime into a unified legal architecture, according to the report. Tighter US tech curbs and a slow global buildout of alternatives to China’s supply chain have also emboldened Beijing to act more assertively.
Why Donald Trump’s ‘G2’ label prompts tepid response from China
While the term treats China and the US as equals, Beijing is probably ‘not enthusiastic’ about its ‘hegemonic’ undertones, analysts say
(SCMP) When US President Donald Trump was about to begin his closely watched summit with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping last month, he wrote a social media post that revived a decades-old concept about the dynamics between the two countries and their role in global affairs.
“The G2 will be convening shortly,” he wrote – in all caps – ahead of the talks.
The term “G2”, or Group of Two, emerged in the 2000s as a proposal for Washington and Beijing to work together to address global challenges. Over time, it has evolved to broadly refer to the US and China as leading powers sharing the world stage.
Trump’s remarks, which hinted at a global duopoly between the US and China, have worried some US allies. But how does it sit with the Chinese leadership?
Beijing is likely to have taken some pride in being treated by Washington as an equal, but its leaders would not be particularly pleased about being referred to as the G2, according to observers.

12 November
China’s Purchases of US Soybeans Stall Despite Trade Truce
(Bloomberg) China’s purchases of American soybeans appear to have stalled, less than two weeks after the US touted a wide-ranging trade truce that signaled thawing relations between the world’s two biggest economies.
After a flurry of orders late last month — which were the first of this season — Chinese imports of US cargoes seem to have faltered, according to traders who asked not to be identified discussing confidential information. They said they were not aware of new shipments. The pause is fueling uncertainty over whether the biggest consumer of American soybeans will import as much as US President Donald Trump’s administration claims to expect.
The agreement with China is seen as crucial for providing relief to struggling American farmers, who have been hard-hit by inflation and high input costs. The Asian country has held off buying US soybeans for much of this season, hurting growers while giving Beijing a key bargaining chip during negotiations with Washington. The US trade with China was worth more than $12 billion last year.

4 November
Setting the Record Straight: What China Actually Agreed to Buy—And When Those Ag Purchases Will Happen
The White House says China will buy 12 MMT of U.S. soybeans in late 2025 and 25 MMT annually through 2028, plus resume U.S. sorghum and hardwood log imports, clearing confusion over comments from Secretary Bessent.*
(AgWeb) The White House announced a sweeping new U.S.–China trade agreement late last week that includes substantial commitments from Beijing to purchase U.S. agricultural products — marking what officials call a “breakthrough” in restoring and expanding trade flows between the two countries.
According to the White House fact sheet, China will buy 12 million metric tons of U.S. soybeans by the end of 2025 and 25 million metric tons annually through 2028. The deal also restores trade in sorghum, hardwood logs, and a range of other commodities while lifting retaliatory tariffs on U.S. beef, pork, dairy, wheat, corn, cotton, and other farm products.
*
30 October
China to Buy 12 Million Metric Tons of Soybeans This Season, Bessent Says
In 2024, the U.S. exported nearly 27 million metric tons of soybeans to China.

29-30 October
The Art of Letting Trump Claim a Win, While Walking Away Stronger
By withholding soybean purchases and rare-earth exports, China extracted relief from U.S. tariffs and delayed export controls, without conceding much in return.
(NYT) By flexing China’s near monopoly on rare earths and its purchasing power over U.S. soybeans, Mr. Xi won key concessions from Washington — a reduction in tariffs, a suspension of port fees on Chinese ships and the delay of U.S. export controls that would have barred more Chinese firms from access to American technology. Both sides also agreed to extend a truce struck earlier this year to limit tariffs.
Xi-Trump meeting: America has discovered that bullies can be bullied back
Patrick Wintour, Diplomatic editor
Outcome appears closer to truce than durable peace but outline of broader diplomatic relationship is visible
(The Guardian) Both sides have taken some of their biggest guns off the table, but this appears closer to a truce than a durable peace setting stable boundaries for China’s relations with the US. Nevertheless the outline of a broader long-term diplomatic relationship is visible, with announced reciprocal visits by each leader within a year. That is very different to what China hawks in Congress were hoping when Trump came to power, and will set alarm bells off on both sides of the aisle.
One of the difficulties has been that Trump’s strategic objectives in launching the trade war were not articulated – the balance between protecting traditional US manufacturing, ring-fencing modern technology-based industries critical to US national security, punishing Chinese trade practices, or more broadly generally overpowering China as a competitive threat, were fudged. Gradually the battle morphed in some US administration minds from a trade war into a geopolitical trial of strength between the two world’s superpowers, a trial that left the whole world awaiting its outcome.
As Trump meets Xi, it’s advantage China
Trump’s brand of chaos has gifted China an opportunity to pitch itself to global partners seeking stability.
(WaPo) Only weeks ago, there were suggestions that President Donald Trump might call off his planned face-to-face meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, scheduled for Thursday on the sidelines of a summit in South Korea. Trump threatened an additional 100 percent tariff on Chinese goods, part of a series of escalations between the two sides that also included China’s imposition of sweeping new controls over the export of rare earth minerals vital to U.S. companies.
Trump may emerge from the Xi summit touting a slate of perceived wins — a deferral of Chinese restrictions on rare earths, some sort of deal over the status of popular social media app TikTok, and relief for U.S. farmers after Trump’s tariffs provoked a Chinese boycott of U.S.-grown soybeans. The White House will cast the outcome as proof of the efficacy of Trump’s unorthodox tactics:
It’s not clear, though, that Trump has the advantage in the current showdown. The apparent deal on offer signals little more than a resumption of the status quo from around when Trump returned to office in January and serves as vindication of China’s own hardball approach to the Trump administration’s coercive tactics.

21 October
What’s at stake during Trump’s visit to Asia
Brookings experts weigh in
In late October 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump is scheduled to travel to Asia for meetings in Japan, Malaysia, and South Korea, where he will attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.  Brookings scholars assess what is at stake in Trump’s visit to the Asia-Pacific region.
Xi goes on offense ahead of summit
Chinese President Xi Jinping has shifted from defense to offense in the run-up to his anticipated summit with President Donald Trump. After spending much of the past year reacting to U.S. policy, Beijing on October 9 announced expansive export controls on the rare earth elements supply chains. Regardless of whether one views Beijing’s move as a reaction or a provocation, it was a calculated gambit by Xi to take the initiative in the bilateral relationship. The timing of the move reflected a crucial difference between Trump and Xi: whereas Trump approaches summits as an opportunity to make a deal, dealmaking is not an important part of Xi’s political persona. Xi’s modus operandi is much more akin to a jack-in-the-box—winding up patiently, sometimes over years, and then popping out at the propitious time. The result should be predictable, yet it is always surprising in the moment.
The United States still has cards to play with China, but ever since the administration walked back its Liberation Day tariffs in the face of China’s retaliation, Beijing has concluded that Washington lacks the stomach to engage in an escalating trade war. A presidential meeting in Korea, accompanied by a renewed “ceasefire” in the U.S.-China trade war, will only reinforce Beijing’s assessment—and invite further unpleasant surprises from Beijing in the coming year. …

11-12 October
China vows to stand firm against Trump’s 100% tariff threat
(AP) — China signaled Sunday that it would not back down in the face of a 100% tariff threat from President Donald Trump, urging the U.S. to resolve differences through negotiations instead of threats. U.S. Vice President JD Vance defended Trump’s position and seemed to warn China not to be aggressive in its response.
“China’s stance is consistent,” the Commerce Ministry said in a statement posted online. “We do not want a tariff war but we are not afraid of one.”
It was China’s first official comment on Trump’s threat to jack up the tax on imports from China by Nov. 1 in response to new Chinese restrictions on the export of rare earths, which are vital to a wide range of consumer and military products.
Trump ratchets up US-China trade war, promising new tariffs
US to impose 100% tariffs on November 1
Software export controls also to take effect
Trump: ‘No reason’ to meet Xi in three weeks
Rift between two largest economies leaves markets reeling
US stocks drop by most since April after Trump’s threat
(Reuters) – U.S. President Donald Trump revived the trade war against Beijing on Friday, ending an uneasy truce between the two largest economies with promises to sharply hike tariffs in a reprisal against China curbing its critical mineral exports.
The president unveiled additional levies of 100% on China’s U.S.-bound exports, along with new export controls on “any and all critical software” by November 1, nine days before existing tariff relief is set to expire.

15 September
US, China reach framework deal on TikTok; Trump and Xi to speak on Friday
Bessent says deal would address US security concerns but keep ‘Chinese characteristics’ of TikTok
Bessent says Trump and Chinese President Xi to hold a call on Friday
Other details of possible deal unclear at this point
US used Trump-Xi summit as leverage for TikTok deal, source says
(Reuters) – U.S. and Chinese officials said on Monday they have reached a framework agreement to switch short-video app TikTok to U.S.-controlled ownership that will be confirmed in a Friday call between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping.
The potential deal on the popular social media app, which counts 170 million U.S. users, was a rare breakthrough in the months-long talks between the world’s No. 1 and No. 2 economies that have sought to defuse a wide-ranging trade war that has unnerved global markets.

4 September
A new theory of China’s rise: rule by engineers
As opposed to America, which is ruled by lawyers
(The Economist) Many of the people who run China are engineers, and it shows. Since the 1980s China has built a motorway network twice the length of America’s and a high-speed rail network more than 15 times the size of Japan’s. It uses almost as much solar and wind power as the rest of the world combined, and it produces around one-third of the world’s manufactured goods.
In his illuminating new book, Breakneck: China’s Quest to Engineer the Future, Dan Wang argues that China is an “engineering state”, locked in competition with America, which is run by lawyers. China builds things quickly. America debates endlessly about whether they should be built at all. How did China, a country that was once known mostly for intellectual-property theft and child labour, become a technological powerhouse?
Practice helps. …and most important, intuition—the know-how and proficiency that comes only through practical experience.
Millions of factory workers and managers across China have spent decades accruing this sort of intuition. As contract manufacturers of smartphones, consumer drones and other sophisticated electronics, they have built a skilled workforce that powers many of the world’s most valuable companies, including Apple, Samsung and China’s own Huawei.

19 August
‘I Don’t Think There’s a Government in Latin America That Has Given In More’
Trump is demanding a Panama-China break-up and triggering political backlash in Panama.
(Politico) In his campaign and after his election, Donald Trump complained about high transit fees for U.S. ships crossing the Panama Canal, said the waterway was controlled by China and pledged to retake it. Now, eight months into his administration, he has looked far beyond the canal for ways to undercut Chinese influence in Panama — and created a political headache for leaders here.

12 August
U.S. cannot afford to lose Diego Garcia
The base’s land could soon be owned by China-tied Mauritius
By Alexander B. Gray and Cleo Paskal – Tuesday, August 12, 2025
(Washington Times) Unless something changes, the land under one of America’s most strategic military bases will be owned by Mauritius, a country with deep and growing ties to China. Just as concerning, American access to that site will depend on whether Britain promptly pays its bills every year for the next century. This is a bet the United States cannot afford to make.
The base, Diego Garcia, is known more colloquially as the “Footprint of Freedom.” Strategically located on the atoll of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, it ranges from Africa, the Middle East and into the broader Indo-Pacific. It can house and launch strategic bombers and reload submarines, and it has a deep-water port for aircraft carriers. It’s a crucial American footprint in one of the most economically and strategically dynamic locations on the planet. It has proved its importance repeatedly, including during the Gulf War and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The atoll of Diego Garcia is part of the Chagos Archipelago, and it belongs to Britain. For now.

11-12 August
US trade team will meet Chinese officials in two or three months, Bessent says
(Reuters) – U.S. trade officials will meet again with their Chinese counterparts within the next two or three months to discuss the future of the economic relationship between the two countries, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said on Tuesday.
The comments come a day after the trading partners extended a tariff truce for another 90 days, staving off triple-digit duties on each other’s goods.
Trump extends China trade truce, setting stage for more ambitious talks
The administration is increasingly seeking to fold non-tariff-related trade disputes into trade negotiations.
(Politico) Senior administration officials had spent weeks hinting that an extension was likely, after the two countries set tariff levels at more than 100 percent on each other’s goods through much of April and early May. The update means the new deadline for massive tariff hikes is Nov. 10.
Tariffs on China Set to Rise Sharply Tuesday if No Deal Is Reached
President Trump has yet to formally sign off on an agreement to extend an economic cease-fire with China, which expires on Tuesday.
(NYT) A trade truce between the United States and China is set to expire on Tuesday if the two countries do not extend the time for talks or reach a last-minute agreement that would prevent President Trump from reimposing sharply higher tariffs on Chinese imports and the Chinese retaliating against American goods.
Top economic officials have been working to finalize a provisional agreement to extend the truce that was reached during meetings in Sweden last month. After the talks, Mr. Trump’s advisers were optimistic that the president would sign off on the arrangement, but thus far he has not publicly granted China an extension. If the tariffs snap back into place, it would escalate a trade war between the world’s two largest economies that rattled global markets earlier this year.Asked on Monday about the looming deadline, Mr. Trump declined to reveal his intentions.

China and the US clash at the UN over the Panama Canal, a focus of Trump’s attention
(AP) — The United States and China clashed over the Panama Canal at the United Nations on Monday, with the U.S. warning that Beijing’s influence over the key waterway could threaten global trade and security and China calling U.S. accusations a pretext to take over the canal.
The clash took place at a U.N. Security Council meeting where Panama’s President José Raúl Mulino stressed the neutrality of the canal and his country’s ownership of the waterway linking the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.
Panama holds the council presidency this month, and Mulino was chairing a meeting on challenges to maritime security. Interpol Secretary General Valdecy Urquiza told members these include piracy, armed robbery, transnational crime and cyber criminals weaponizing artificial intelligence to attack ports where there is “minimal cyber security, maximum exposure.”

Interwoven frontiers: Energy, AI, and US-China competition
R. David Edelman
(Brookings) The fates of breakthrough technologies and the energy to power them are deeply interwoven, with progress at scale in one difficult to advance without the other. Nowhere is this interconnection more consequential—and more dynamic—than in the U.S.-China relationship, which is marked by intense political tensions and competition, but also by under-appreciated technical overlap. Given the inescapably interconnected nature of digital and energy systems, and of U.S. and Chinese progress there-within, current and future U.S. administrations will need to consider both together, making conscious decisions about how technology investments may drive new frontiers in energy production, and how new energy innovations will be essential to progress in applied and cross-cutting technology priority areas like artificial intelligence (AI).
The Nvidia Chip Deal Helps China Achieve Its AI Goals
US concerns about competition and security are traded away for a piece of the action.
(Bloomberg) In 2017, China outlined its plan to make the country the dominant global force in artificial intelligence by 2030. President Xi Jinping provided the will and the funds to move quickly, ramping up homegrown semiconductor manufacturing, data center construction and a power grid to support it. But one thing had been holding it back in its fight with the US — reduced access to the best American-designed semiconductors. The White House has given up at least some US advantage in return for a 15% cut of the sales of AI chips to China by Nvidia Corp. and Advanced Micro Devices.

10 August
CNMI: China eyes control of America’s Asian frontline
Cleo Paskal
China needs to be emplaced in CNMI if it is going to take Taiwan. Usually the focus is on Guam, but widen the geographic aperture and it’s clear that whatever applies to Guam applies equally to CNMI. And Beijing knows it.
The Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) are a U.S. territory just north of Guam. To the south, CNMI waters touch Guam waters, and to the north, they touch those of Japan.
The main island of CNMI is Saipan. From Saipan, it is around an eight-hour flight east to Hawaii. But it’s only around four hours to Tokyo, Seoul or Taipei.
This is America’s Asian frontline.
… Its strategic geography and non-standard labour and immigration laws meant almost from the start things got odd. And as time went on—and Beijing grew bolder—Chinese influence started to deeply penetrate and distort CNMI.
Still today, Chinese can arrive in CNMI without a visa. Yes, you read that right. Chinese can arrive in a part of the U.S. without a visa. They aren’t supposed to leave CNMI but there are regular cases of Chinese illegally taking the 60-mile boat trip to Guam—where some have been found on U.S. military bases. Oh, and there’s also the birth tourism issue. …

6 August
PASKAL: China Is Building It’s Beachhead In Micronesia The Same Way Japan Did In The 1930s
Steve Bannon, Dr. Bradley Thayer, and Cleo Paskal marked the anniversary of August 6, 1945—the first use of an atomic weapon—emphasizing its historic, strategic, and modern-day significance. Bannon framed the audience as the “adults in the room” of the populist-nationalist movement, drawing parallels between the end of WWII and today’s geopolitical challenges.
Paskal recounted Tinian’s role as the launch site for the Enola Gay, noting its history under Japanese control, its liberation by U.S. forces, and its transformation into a critical base within bomber range of Tokyo. She warned of parallels between Imperial Japan’s pre‑war buildup and current Chinese Communist Party activities in the Pacific, including economic infiltration that could undermine U.S. strategic positioning.
Thayer stressed the atomic bombings ended the war, saving hundreds of thousands of American lives and millions of Japanese, while preventing Soviet occupation of northern Japan. He highlighted the dawn of the atomic age, the necessity of a strong U.S. industrial base, and lessons for countering the Chinese Communist Party today—particularly the importance of naval and air power in the Pacific.

28-31 July
Panama Official Seeks Review of CK Hutchison Port Contract
(Bloomberg) Panama’s comptroller general asked its Supreme Court to review the government’s contract extension with CK Hutchison Holdings Ltd.’s local ports unit, potentially throwing a new wrench into the conglomerate’s controversial deal to sell its global terminals business.
Panamanian official Anel Flores said he asked the court to find unconstitutional a 2021 extension for Panama Ports Co.’s contract to operate two ports along the Panama Canal and declare it null and void.
… The development risks further complicating a transaction that’s become a high-profile tussle between the US and China. CK Hutchison shares fell 2.2% in Hong Kong trading on Thursday, dropping the most in over a month.
… The Panama terminals are at the center of the geopolitically delicate deal for the 43 ports owned by Hong Kong tycoon Li Ka-shing’s CK Hutchison. A buyer consortium backed by BlackRock Inc. is seeking to acquire the business, with the American asset manager taking control of Panama Ports.
How Li Ka-shing Landed in the Middle of US-China Tiff
When President Donald Trump called for the US to retake control of the Panama Canal during his inauguration speech in January, it set off a chain of events that landed Hong Kong tycoon Li Ka-shing in the middle of a US-China tiff.
Li, whose conglomerate CK Hutchison Holdings Ltd. owns two port operations on the Panama Canal, came under political pressure from the Trump administration after the US leader falsely claimed that the strategic waterway was operated by China.
In March, CK Hutchison announced an expansive deal to sell 43 of its ports around the world — including its Panama Canal operations — to a consortium backed by BlackRock Inc. While this move was welcomed by Trump, it angered the Chinese government, which has said it will review the transaction. After a 145-day window for exclusive talks on the sale lapsed on July 27, CK Hutchison said it might invite a strategic investor from China to join the consortium.
… A unit of CK Hutchison controls two out of five ports adjacent to the Panama Canal, which handles roughly 3% of global seaborne trade. Panama initially granted the concession to the company in 1998 and renewed it for 25 years in 2021.
That wasn’t a problem until Trump began to focus on the waterway. He’s argued that it was “foolish” of the US, which built the canal, to turn over the right to operate it to Panama in 1999. He’s complained about the fees to use the waterway and made false claims about Chinese control. China’s growing influence in Latin America through major infrastructure projects has been a concern for both Democratic and Republican administrations in the US.
With pressure from the Trump administration growing, CK Hutchison announced a deal to sell 43 ports in 23 countries while keeping facilities in mainland China and Hong Kong. Analysts have said CK Hutchison negotiated a good price. The $19 billion in cash proceeds it’s agreed for just part of its ports unit is almost as much as the market valuation of the entire conglomerate before the deal was announced. …

31 July
How does the CCP use Saipan as a way to enter the U.S.?
Cleo Paskal joins Bannon’s War Room to discuss the Chinese Communist Party’s malign influence in the Indo-Pacific. (video)

25-29 July
The death of CNMI Governor Arnold Palacios and calls to investigate CCP corruption
Cleo joins Bannon’s War Room to discuss the death of Northern Mariana Islands Governor Arnold Palacios and the need for an investigation into CCP corruption the American territory. (video)
Died Suddenly: Cleo Paskal On CCP infiltration In The Northern Mariana Islands (video)
24 July
Gov. Palacios passes away; Apatang assumes office

23 July
China’s strategy? Let Trump cook.
As President Donald Trump dismantles U.S. soft power and launches trade wars with allies, China is content to sit back and watch.
(WaPo) Beijing sees Trump’s disruptive actions — his gutting of institutions of U.S. soft power, his launching of trade wars against adversaries and allies alike, his steady eroding of trust in the U.S. alliance system — as acts of self-sabotage that need no Chinese prompting. .
After Trump moved to dismember the U.S. Agency for Global Media, which backed internationally oriented outlets such as Voice of America, Chinese state-made broadcasts took the place of U.S. programming on TV networks in countries as disparate as Indonesia and Nigeria. Trump, like a growing number of Republicans, viewed the media properties as suspicious fonts of “anti-American” liberalism. But Chinese propagandists exulted at the demise of these U.S.-funded news operations, which had, to varying extents, chronicled the state of pro-democracy movements around the world and provided space for dissident voices in countries where political freedoms are curtailed.

21 July
The US, China, and the critical minerals question
(GZERO) Ian Bremmer analyzes a significant shift in US–China relations: Donald Trump’s decision to ease key technology restrictions on Beijing in an effort to secure access to critical minerals.
This move has stunned America’s national security community. Ian explains that members of the military-industrial complex are “horrified that the Chinese now no longer have a constraint on being able to compete with and potentially dominate the Americans in this most important space.”
“This is giving away the store,” Ian adds, emphasizing that the decision ultimately hands China a significant strategic advantage.

10 June
Trump Hails Progress With China, but Details Are Sketchy
Two days of trade talks resulted in what leaders called a framework agreement meant to solidify terms of a truce that the superpowers reached in Geneva last month.
(NYT) President Trump said Wednesday that the United States and China had struck a deal to roll back some of the punitive measures they had taken against each other’s economies in recent months, including his administration’s recently proposed restrictions on Chinese students attending U.S. universities.
The agreement followed two days of marathon negotiations in London, and will return the countries to the terms of a trade truce they had reached in May, after weeks of escalating tensions between them.

5-6 June
Xi Bets Trump Detente Leads to Future Wins on Chips, Tariffs
(Bloomberg AI summary) Donald Trump declared that Xi Jinping agreed to restore the flow of rare earth magnets after a 90-minute phone call
Xi Jinping appears to be betting that a reset in ties will lead to tangible wins, including tariff reductions, an easing of export controls, and a more civil tone.
The call provides tactical de-escalation for US-China relations, but China’s core demands, including equal sanction relief and an end to tech containment, remain critical for sustainable agreements.
Xi and Trump Hold Call, China Says
Chinese state media said the leaders spoke by phone on Thursday, amid worsening tensions between Washington and Beijing.
(NYT) President Trump spoke to China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, on Thursday for the first time since taking office, according to Chinese state media, as a fragile truce in a trade war between the world’s two largest economies shows signs of unraveling.
The call was reported by Chinese state media in a brief dispatch late Thursday that did not immediately include details. Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi were last known to have spoken to each other on Jan. 17, days before Mr. Trump was inaugurated as president.
The call comes as tensions between China and the United States have ratcheted up again nearly a month after the two sides met in Geneva and agreed to a pause in the trade war.
On Wednesday, Mr. Trump wrote on social media that Mr. Xi was “VERY TOUGH, AND EXTREMELY HARD TO MAKE A DEAL WITH.”
While America’s Front Doors are Closing to China, Back Doors are Opening
The hypocrisy of Trump’s techno-nationalism
Robert Reich
When it comes to non-Americans, Trump and his regime are clear: Foreigners — especially if they’re Chinese — are no longer wanted here. Nor are their products. Nor are we prepared to sell them our advanced technologies.
But foreign bribes? Hell, they’re welcome at the highest levels, even if they result in some critical technologies reaching China.
First, consider all the front doors now closing to China.
The State Department is revoking the visas of Chinese students who are “studying in critical fields.” This could be a big deal. Some 277,000 students from China attended school in the United States last year, second only to the number of students from India.
In addition to raising tariffs on Chinese products entering the United States, Trump is considering prohibiting major Chinese chipmakers — as well as units of Chinese technology giants like Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu — from trading with the United States.
Meanwhile, the United States has ordered a broad swath of American companies to stop shipping high-tech goods to China without a license and revoked licenses already granted to certain suppliers.
… A technology trail now leads from the United States to oil-producing nations and then to China.
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates have been granting Trump personal favors. Their presumed goal is to get access to American technology. … What do Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE get from all these deals? All are seeking to diversify their economies away from oil by boosting their technology sectors.
Trump is granting them greater access to advanced technologies from the United States, including advanced semiconductors from companies like Nvidia and AMD.
Yet at the same time, these nations are strengthening their strategic partnerships with China in artificial intelligence, advanced computing, and quantum information technology.
They’ve entered into joint ventures with Chinese counterparts for producing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and AI-related projects, including the development of smart cities and AI-powered infrastructure.
Here’s another back door to China: Chinese crypto billionaire Justin Sun, who’s based in Hong Kong.
Sun is the largest holder of Trump’s $TRUMP memecoin. His $23-million investment has put him into the exclusive circle of investors who were invited to a private VIP dinner with Trump on May 22.

12-18 May
By eroding US soft power, Trump is ceding the contest to China
(SCMP) Trump 2.0 has boosted China’s charm offensive, making its assertive foreign policy and unapologetic authoritarianism look less threatening …since US President Donald Trump’s return to office, the balance of international attraction has been shifting remarkably in Beijing’s favour.
China Called Trump’s Bluff
There is a lesson here for everybody Trump threatens, whether countries or businesses or universities..
By Jonathan Chait
(The Atlantic) When President Donald Trump launched his trade war on the world, he issued a stern warning: “Do not retaliate and you will be rewarded.” China ignored the warning. It was rewarded anyway. This morning, Trump largely suspended his trade war in return for nothing but promises of ongoing discussions.
The unveiling of the Trump global tariff regime was accompanied by a distinct form of dominance theater. The president and his gang assured his targets that if they submitted to his tariffs, he would repay their compliance. Any country that dared defy him would suffer terribly.
Most of the world…discover[ed] the difficulty of making global trade deals with a president who doesn’t seem to understand how trade works. Foreign diplomats expressed repeated frustration as they failed to ascertain what Trump even wanted from them, let alone what he was prepared to offer in return. To date, only the United Kingdom has managed to resolve its trade status with the United States.
Trump might claim China tariff victory – but this is Capitulation Day
Heather Stewart, Economics editor
The president’s retreat suggests he might negotiate elsewhere, but leaves corrosive uncertainty in its wake
(The Guardian) … If Trump is indeed ready to give in even with Beijing, it sends a signal that some of the other aggressive aspects of his trade policy may be negotiable.
What Bessent and his Chinese counterparts have not erased, however, is the corrosive uncertainty that has gripped investors across the global economy since Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariff announcement.
China tariffs have only been slashed temporarily, for now and many other countries are still awaiting negotiations on where their tariff levels will end up, after that other 90-day pause, on Trump’s “reciprocal” levies, due to end in July.
Meanwhile, companies throughout the global trading system are left wondering which particular iteration of the policy is likely to stick, and may well be tempted to continue working around the US, where possible.
And with 30% tariffs remaining on Chinese exports to the US, the bigger picture remains of two great economic powers pulling apart.
America has given China a strangely good tariff deal
For the next 90 days, at least

Tariff Truce With China Demonstrates the Limits of Trump’s Aggression
President Trump’s triple-digit tariffs on Chinese products disrupted global trade — but haven’t appeared to result in major concessions from Beijing.
(NYT) Trade talks between the world’s largest economies in Geneva this weekend concluded with an agreement to reduce stiff levies on each other’s products by more than many analysts had anticipated. Chinese imports will face a minimum tax of 30 percent, down from 145 percent. China will lower its import duty on American goods to 10 percent from 125 percent. The two countries also agreed to hold talks to stabilize the relationship.
The tariffs ultimately proved too painful to American businesses for Mr. Trump to sustain. Within weeks, Trump officials were saying that the tariffs the president had chosen to impose on one of America’s largest trading partners were unsustainable, and that they were angling to reduce them.

9 May
You called me. No — you called ME. Before US-China meeting, nations each say the other wanted talks
(AP) “The obsession with who reached out first is a proxy fight over leverage,” said Craig Singleton, senior director of the China program at the Washington-based think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “For Washington, signaling that Beijing initiated the meeting reinforces the narrative that the tariffs are working. For Beijing, denying outreach preserves the illusion of parity and avoids domestic perception of weakness.”

7 May
US, China to hold ice-breaker trade talks in Geneva on Saturday
Bessent, Greer will hold trade talks with China’s He Lifeng
Stock markets lifted by prospect of tensions easing
U.S.-China tariffs “the equivalent of an embargo”, Bessent says
China injects new monetary stimulus to combat tariff blow
(Reuters) U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and chief trade negotiator Jamieson Greer will meet China’s economic tsar He Lifeng in Switzerland this weekend for talks that could be the first step toward resolving a trade war disrupting the global economy.
Who is He Lifeng, the Chinese trade tsar taking centre stage in US tariff talks?
Vice Premier He to meet U.S. officials on Saturday
He initially underwhelmed foreign investors, but has gained confidence and experience
He described as ideological proponent of state-led growth
(Reuters) – He Lifeng, a longtime confidant of Chinese President Xi Jinping who has slowly cultivated a reputation among foreign investors as a key fixer, will take centre stage in talks on Saturday aimed at breaking a trade deadlock with the United States.
Trump’s team is finally meeting with China. The future of the global economy is riding on its success
CNN — US President Donald Trump’s top trade officials will meet with their Chinese counterparts this week to discuss a de-escalation of their increasingly ugly and damaging trade war. The future of the global economy is riding on their success.
The trade talks, the first in-person meeting between Chinese and American officials since the tit-for-tat tariff escalation kicked off in earnest in March, are unlikely to result in a trade deal, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said Tuesday. But tariffs have reached such a high level that trade between the two countries has dropped off dramatically. Any thaw in the trade war could be a welcome sign for businesses and consumers in both countries and around the globe.
“The main objective of this meeting is to establish the conditions for a deal to be reached, including by defining what is feasible to be agreed upon and what isn’t,” said Alfredo Montufar-Helu, head of the Conference Board’s China Center. “There might be some quick wins, like a temporal pause of tariffs, which would bring much needed relief to businesses from both countries.”